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INTRODUCTION
The economic development that characterizes the second half of the 
19th century goes hand in hand in most countries with an impor-
tant increase of the number of bankruptcies (Lester, 1995; Mann, 2009; 
Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2010; Telfer, 2010). This phenomenon apparently 
cannot be distinguished from the other aspects of the boom of capital-
ism that took place during this period. The increasing role of exit is so 
probably a component of the Schumpeterian creative destruction which 
describes the “process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolu-
tionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the 
old one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter, 1994, pp. 82–83). 
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In the institutional conception of this movement, bankruptcy is thus a 
social mechanism designed to organize exit, giving support to contractual 
exchange. Indeed, bankruptcy laws and procedures provide at that time 
an excellent dispute settlement institution (Bignon and Sgard, 2007), and 
bankruptcy is at the heart of the market functioning and contribute to the 
reliability of the economic system (Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2007). 
Since the Ancien Regime, lawyers, scholars and legislators repeatedly pro-
posed to change the insolvency laws in order to improve the functioning 
of the economy, to attract foreign firms and investors, and to increase 
national competitiveness (Mascret, 1863). More recently, some proponents 
of “law and economics” (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998) reactivated the old law-
yers’ claim that the impact of bankruptcy law on national economic per-
formance is important. Empirically, their argument is mainly based on 
the comparison of allegedly autonomous legal traditions, with little con-
sideration for actual practices or for legal transformations over the long 
run. Our position differs from their: as in the “20th century divergence” 
debate in international relations (James, 2001) or in financial systems 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003), we consider that bankruptcy laws in 19th cen-
tury Europe were much more comparable among countries, than com-
monly assessed, and that they varied frequently in a similar manner 
(Sgard 2006, Hautcoeur and Di Martino, 2013). More importantly, and in 
accordance with Fridenson (2004), we consider that closing firms involves 
economic, social and human costs which go beyond their frontiers and 
that these externalities impose bankruptcy to be legally organized.
A legal system is not a simple set of rules allowing for perfect and trans-
parent contracts. Rather, it is made of several components ranging from 
the laws to the persons (or entities subject to the law), the lawyers, and 
finally the judges (within courts). This complexity cannot be tackled by 
looking only at the “law on the books” since it would lead to a biased view 
of the whole phenomenon (Macaulay, 2005). Bankruptcies do not escape 
this drawback. This is the reason why this research rests upon a “law in 
action” conception to identify the influence of economic, social, and legal 
contexts on the treatment of firms’ failure. It leads us to examine the 
interaction between legal rules and practice to explore the possibility that 
court practices could precede and not always follow legal changes, and 
that, even in a civil-law country like France, court practice can vary sub-
stantially from a direct application of the law. 
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From a reconstitution of data published in the Comptes  Genéraux  de 
l’administration de la justice published by the French Ministry of Justice from 
1820, we consider the different possible causes of the sharp increase in 
the number of corporate bankruptcies observed along the last two thirds 
of the 19th century. We stop the analysis in 1913, a year frequently consid-
ered as the genuine end of the century. Our results show that the changes 
in the law and the judicial innovations that aimed at facilitating access to 
legal procedures are not always at the origin of the evolution of the num-
ber of cases. Instead, an intricate relation appears between the changes 
in the commercial code, the practices in the commerce courts and the 
financial characteristics of the insolvent companies on the one hand, and 
the changes in the number and results of the procedures on the other. 
We show thus that the continuous interactions between formal rules and 
practices are much more powerful to explain the evolution of the bank-
ruptcy regime over the 19th century than the unidirectional perspective 
going from the law to the practices.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the 
evolution of French bankruptcy law during the 19th century. Section 2 
briefly describes the methodology and the dataset. Section 3 describes the 
evolution of the number of bankruptcies in France whereas sections 4, 5, 
and 6 examine alternative specific explanations (respectively local specif-
icities, court practices and economic context) to the increase in the num-
ber of procedures. The conclusion contains some general proposals to sup-
port a renewed conception of bankruptcies.
1. LEGAL HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
The history of bankruptcy law over the 19th century is the object of numer-
ous research and publications (Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2010 provide a 
comprehensive description). 
Bankruptcy law occupies around one third of the 1807 Code du Commerce, 
which defines some of its major characteristics for the entire century. 
Since the Ancien Regime, bankruptcies are under the responsibility of 
specific commercial courts, composed of judges elected among notable 
merchants in each resort. Appeals are judged by civil courts, which makes 
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commercial courts a specialized jurisdiction under the responsibility of 
civil courts. Nevertheless, commercial courts are quite independent in 
practice, and commercial law is quite distinct from civil law. Similarly, 
bankruptcy procedure is separated from the judgment of its possible delin-
quent or fraudulent origins. These last cases are the responsibility of penal 
courts under the name of banqueroute. Commercial courts are exclusively 
reserved to merchants (commerçants), defined as every person (natural or 
legal) usually buying and selling goods or services, but excluding farmers, 
professionals, wage earners and civil servants.
Bankruptcy (faillite) is equivalent to the default of payment (cessation de paie-
ments), but the procedure is started only by a judgment stating that a per-
son or a company (société) is insolvent, i.e. is unable to repay the amount 
due to claimants. The procedure can be started either at the initiative of 
the bankrupt himself (by producing his balance sheet to the court, so the 
usual name dépôt de bilan), by his creditors (requête) or by the court (d’office). 
The bankrupt is supposed to be jailed, and the judge to name a trustee (syn-
dic) responsible for the management of the procedure in the interest of the 
creditors. This supposes either finding a composition ( concordat), that is an 
agreement with the creditors allowing the perpetuation of the firm (usu-
ally with a restructuring of debts) or organizing the complete liquidation 
of the debtor’s estate (union). The procedure starts with a verification of 
the assets and liabilities of the bankrupt firm, which can lead to an imme-
diate stop if assets are insufficient to cover the costs of the procedure. 
In such a situation the case is settled as “shortage of assets” (insuffisance 
d’actif). If the assets are sufficient, creditors are grouped into in secured 
and ordinary ones. Creditors holding mortgages, other security or special 
priority are reimbursed first. The remaining creditors pertain the masse, 
which decides on the concordat on a majority basis. 
The 1807 Code is established under an authoritarian government aiming at 
stabilizing a society much affected by the revolutionary years, and espe-
cially at re-establishing traditional authorities and property-based wealth 
at the top of society. It is seen as excessively severe and inefficient by many 
contemporaries, by the courts themselves and by most of the historiogra-
phy (e.g. Percerou, 1935; Hilaire, 1992; Jobert, 1991; Richard, 2005, Hautcoeur 
and Levratto, 2007). The strict application of the code results in an exces-
sive recourse to jail, makes difficult reaching a concordat, and involves 
slow and costly procedures. It is probably efficient in making bankruptcy 
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a threat to all traders, but not in protecting the interests of the creditors. 
It also impedes unlucky traders having a fresh start, since, except under a 
concordat, all assets they accumulate later can always be seized under their 
bankruptcy case, and they remain deprived of all political and some civil 
rights. This exclusion lasts as long as they don’t obtain a very unlikely réha-
bilitation, which supposes a complete reimbursement of all debts with inter-
est. Then, debtors facing payment difficulties try to avoid the courts by set-
tling their case privately with their creditors, something which frequently 
leads to inequalities among creditors or even fraud 1. 
The 1830 Revolution brings to power liberal and business friendly elites 
that tackle these problems. The 1838 Act introduces a major change which 
facilitates the conclusion of concordats for bankrupts of “good faith” (espe-
cially if they had initiated the procedure) and allows the courts to decide 
that even bankrupts under union are excusable 2. The procedure is simpli-
fied, tax costs are decreased, and the syndic is given the right to manage 
the business of the bankrupt (with his help if necessary) in order to main-
tain the value of what is being increasingly considered as the creditors’ 
main implicit guarantee. 
Further changes go in the same liberal direction. In 1856, the composition 
by “relinquishment of assets” (concordat par abandon d’actifs) gives the pos-
sibility to the bankrupt to abandon its assets to the creditors and start a 
new business without having to fear that his new assets will be seized in 
order to compensate his creditors. In 1867, the prison for debt (contrainte par 
corps) is abolished (Levratto, 2009). This change is part of a political evolu-
tion favouring personal liberties which has also appeared previously in the 
decreasing use of jail in bankruptcy procedures (Guyot & Raffalovitch, 1901: 
135). In 1903, the possibility of a full réhabilitation of the debtor is facilitated.
More importantly, following two tentative provisory legislations under the 
special circumstances of the 1848 revolution and the Franco-Prussian 1870 
war, a special procedure called judicial liquidation (liquidation judiciaire) is 
created in 1889. It allows the settlement of bankruptcy cases without the 
1 Some considered that the nomination of the syndic by the creditors, which was the 
norm up to 1838, allowed some of them, often with the complicity of the debtor, to 
appropriate most of the assets (Desurvire, 1992, p. 50s).
2 They regain normal commercial rights, but not all political ones.
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still infamous name of faillite. The new procedure is reserved to bankrupts 
of good faith whose failure results from unlucky exogenous circumstances, 
and who have initiated the procedure. Then it is supposed to end-up in a 
concordat, although union and insuffisance d’actifs are also possible.
In sum, over the second part of the 19th century, the evolution of bank-
ruptcy law in France follows a liberalizing pattern, like in most other 
European countries (Sgard, 2006). The requirements of economic effi-
ciency, especially the need to provide for the maximum repayment to 
creditors, for the continuity of all existing “good” firms and for the fresh 
start of unlucky entrepreneurs, becomes more important than the need to 
sanction any borrower unable to repay his debts and to exclude him from 
the community of merchants. Nevertheless, ex-ante incentives to repay-
ment remain high since concordat is not a right (so that many bankrupt 
merchants lose entirely control over their assets) and faillite remains some-
what infamous. As asserted by Ripert (2004), French bankruptcy law has 
always accompanied the development of capitalism. 
This increasingly tolerant and protective set of legal rules organizing 
firms’ default gives excellent reasons to entrepreneurs to file for bank-
ruptcy. However, the causes of the sharp increase in the number of insol-
vencies observed over the second part of the 19th century remain unclear, 
since it is not (as we will see below) driven by the procedures initiated by 
the debtors. We propose to disentangle this question considering practices 
of the French courts through the prism of the law. We will concentrate 
on long run changes from 1820 (or at least 1840) to 1913 and on the broad 
changes in the law previously presented.
2. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Closing a business is not a simple affair. Considering it empirically is not 
straightforward either. Indeed, a major difficulty comes from the lack of 
data on the private settlements that are a major alternative to bankruptcy 
procedures 3. Another challenge is to distinguish the effects of the law 
3 Information on these settlements was actually better in the 18th century than 
nowadays (Deshusses, 2008).
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from those of other variables affecting the total number of failures. The 
question is all the more difficult when changes in the law are frequently 
anticipated by court decisions (sometimes for a long time), but can also be 
delayed by reluctant courts 
Another question emerges from a long run analysis. It deals with the 
endogeneity of bankruptcy law. Both political economy theory and archi-
val records suggest that all participants in the bankruptcy procedures 
(mostly merchant communities organized in chambers of commerce or 
more specific lobbies, and the legal professions) try to modify the law in 
their favour. As discussed previously, the law has actually been modified, 
mostly in the direction favoured by the merchant community, although 
the timing depended on many circumstances. 
We propose to explore different possible causes of the sharp increase in 
the number of bankruptcies by looking at data covering a period from 1830 
to 1913. The precise date at which we begin the analysis on particular top-
ics depends on the source used.
For this research we rely on the statistical summary of the courts’ activ-
ity published by the Ministry of Justice under the title Compte général de 
l’administration de la justice from 1830 to 1914 (yearly from 1840). These reports 
typically included some 200 pages of statistics every year, based on a sys-
tematic collection of micro-level data produced by each court. They allowed 
the Ministry of Justice to monitor the activity of local jurisdictions, espe-
cially the elected, largely-self-managed commercial courts 4. The Comptes 
Généraux provide information about the number of cases, the accumulated 
backlog, the outcomes, value of assets and liabilities, etc.). They thus offer 
a detailed view of how the procedures worked and evolved, and how they 
appropriate the tools and procedures provided by law (Hautcoeur, 2008). 
As already done in previous research (Marco, 1989, Bignon and Sgard, 
2007, Hautcoeur and Levratto, 2010), this paper rests upon reconstructed 
time-series, all based on the Comptes Généraux de l’administration de la justice.
4 On average, there were around 210 and 220 commercial courts, plus 170 civil courts 
dealing with commercial affairs; but the former absorbed close to 80% of total bank-
ruptcy cases.
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3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER  
OF BANKRUPTCIES: THE LAW DOES  
NOT EXPLAIN IT ALL
The number of new bankruptcy procedures opened each year increases 
sharply in France during the 19th century (graph 1). This increase is more 
important than those of both GDP 5 (2.4% vs. 1.6% yearly increase from 1820 
to 1913) and the number of firms (0.8% from 1827 to 1913, Jobert, 1991, p. 35). 
The proportion of firms going bankrupt in the course of a year rises from 1 
to 4 per thousand from the 1820s to the 1880s, and stabilizes (even slightly 
decreases) afterwards. One can also notice that, once the new bankruptcy 
law of 1838 is established the increase in the number of bankruptcies is 
relatively stable from the 1840s to the 1880s. Three interruptions in the 
trend are visible; the first one, in the early 1830s, is not easy to explain 
(the data at that early moment is also less abundant); the two others cor-
respond to special legislations created during the 1848-52 (1848 Revolution 
5 The number of bankruptcies should increase with GDP if the size of firms is constant.




  Number of bankruptcies (faillites + liquidations judiciaires) opened each year, number 
of firms created (thousands) and GDP (logarithmic scale).
Sources: Comptes  généraux  de  l’administration  de  la  justice (1820-1913) for bankruptcies; 
Annuaire  statistique de  la France (1913) for patentes, Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) 
for GDP. 
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and Second Republic) and the 1870-71 (Franco-Prussian war) periods. Later 
on, the number of bankruptcies stabilized, even when the new liquidations 
judiciaires are included in the statistics (as they are in the upper line in 
graph 1); the absolute maximum for the total was reached in 1898 with 
almost 10,000 new procedures opened in that year. 
Three major points worth are worth highlighting:
 − The rapid increase in the number of bankruptcies from the 1840s 
to the early 1860s resulted mostly from the choices of debtors, since 
they initiated at least 60% of the total number of new bankruptcy 
cases (graph 2). This probably results from the 1838 law, which aims 
to facilitate the recourse to the judicial treatment of insolvency 
instead of negotiating private settlements (unfortunately, we don’t 
know the proportion of debtors’ initiated procedures before the law).
 − Between 1865 and 1869, a dramatic change takes place within a 
few years: the proportion of bankruptcies initiated by the debtor 
decreases from 57% (1865-66) to 45% (1868-69). According to many 
contemporary commentators, it results from the abolishment of 
prison for debt, which suppresses the incentive for debtors to file 
Graph 2. Origins of the newbankruptcy cases every year (faillites only)
This graph gives the shares of new bankruptcies by origin (debtor’s decision: “dépôt de 
bilan”; creditors’ demand:”requête des créanciers”; court’s decision: “faillites d’office”). 
In percentage of the total (sum to one).
Sources: Comptes généraux de l’administration de la justice (1840-1913). Authors’ computations.
Note: This graph does not include liquidations judiciaires, which can only be started by the 
debtor, and represent around one third of the total number of bankruptcies from 1890. 
Data from 1871 to 1885 are not available.
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for bankruptcy (dépôt de bilan) as they did it earlier mainly because 
this procedure allowed them to escape it (see below). 
 − The 1889 law distinguishes between liquidations judiciaires, which can 
only be started at the initiative of the debtor, and faillites. It is fol-
lowed by a drop in the proportion of faillites started by the debtor 
(from 40% in 1888 to 28% in 1890, see graph 2). But at the global level, 
the proportion of bankruptcies (faillites + liquidations judiciaries) started 
by the debtor increases from 40 to 50%. The introduction of the liq-
uidation  judiciaire is a major innovation since it permits an increas-
ing number of debtors to file for bankruptcy before their creditors 
sue them. The best debtors then likely switched from faillite to liqui-
dation  judiciaire; the overall number of procedures increased in the 
short run but was stable in the long run. It may be that it had at that 
time become impossible to attract towards the judicial system those 
still preferring private settlements, or maybe there were few of them 
after these legal changes, something which would suggest a quite 
efficient judiciary organization of bankruptcy, contrary to those 
interpretations which argue for a belated French bankruptcy law. 
4. NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES  
AND LOCAL DIFFERENCES
The evolution of the proportion of bankruptcies initiated by the debtors 
suggests that incentives brought by legislative change plays a role, but 
only up to a limit. Studying the regional variations of the bankruptcy data 
shows that legal practices are heterogeneous and that they probably differ 
according to the courts and the regions where they are located.
Map 1 shows that the number of procedures initiated by the debtors scaled 
by the total number of bankruptcy strongly differ from one court to 
another. This heterogeneity characterizes the whole period under study 
even if one can notice a common trend, especially over the last years. 
Indeed, the maps show that the share of dépôts de bilans dropped all over 
France at the same time.
After the enactment of the 1838 law, the regional pattern of the propor-
tion of bankruptcies initiated by the debtors suggests that if this law 
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introduces major changes, it mainly reflects practices already existing in 
Paris (map 1). Paris is a first mover in having a high proportion of bank-
ruptcies initiated by the debtor. Actually, during the early 1840s, Paris 
is almost the only place with, to a lesser extent, Bordeaux and Colmar, 
where such bankruptcies dominate (77% of new bankruptcies in 1840). 
This Parisian specific pattern may result from the characteristics of the 
regional economy, but it may also result from the specific behaviour of the 
judges in the Tribunal de commerce de la Seine, who are considered as pio-
neers by several contemporaries. Indeed, Parisian judges use more than 
in other regions the contrainte par corps allowing for the imprisonment of 
debtors at justice or creditors’ request (see map 2), so much indeed that 
creditors from all over France try to bring their cases to Paris when possi-
ble. But the same judges also provide widely sauf-conduits (provisory libera-
tion from jail) once a case is started (especially if the debtor initiates the 
procedure or is considered reliable or as having few reasons to escape) so 
that at the end few debtors stay in jail (see maps 3).
Map 2. Number of people jailed through contrainte par corps scaled  













Source: Compte général de l’administration de la justice. Authors’ computations and map.
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Actually, some consider that the 1838 law was probably passed in order to 
“legalize” and extend the Parisian model i.e. more bankruptcies, and a 
higher proportion of them initiated by the debtor and conducing to more 
satisfactory public settlements through concordats instead of private settle-
ments. In the following decades, the model was adopted in most French 
regions. This convergence then explains a substantial part of the nation-
wide growth in the number of bankruptcies. This convergence was not a 
naturel process, but it resulted from the dissemination of “good practices” 
to the entire territory under the control of the Ministry of Justice and 
the Parisian Appeal court (which covers about one third of the national 
territory as measured by number of bankruptcies). The change intro-
duced by the 1867 law does not substantially alter this growing homoge-
neity (table 1): it causes a decrease in the number of dépôts de bilan in every 
region, and especially in Paris where their share drops from 63 to 46% in 
four years, and the standard deviation remains at its low 1865 level.
The creation of liquidation  judiciaire in 1889 is another cause of trouble. 
This law has been discussed for several years before being voted, facing 
strong opposition on the basis of its “moral” impact. Whereas some regions 
immediately apply it, some others don’t use the new options opened by 
the law. As a consequence, the proportion of liquidations in new bankrupt-
cies varies from around 15% in Paris (and 20% in Lyon or Aix-en-Provence) 
to around 50% in Rennes, Nancy, Douai, Chambéry or Bourges. This may 
Map 3. Proportions of bankrupts jailed (left side) or without control  
(sauf conduit) (right side) in 1845-46
Source: Compte général de l’administration de la justice. Authors’ computations and 
maps.
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result from the differences in the interpretation of the law from one court 
to another 6. Our interpretation is the following: if the 1889 law does lit-
tle to increase the incentive for debtors to initiate bankrupt in the main 
(and most modern) commercial centres (where they already do it), it helps 
the more peripheral regions to catch up. Map 4 shows that the number of 
bankruptcies scaled by the number of operating firms in 1888 widely var-
ies among regions. It tends to be higher in the main commercial places 
like Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Bordeaux (with the exception of the Nord). 
In the following decade (1888-1900), the number of bankruptcies increases 
significantly more in those regions that were behind in 1888. This catch-
up process is rooted in the new possibilities offered by the liquidation judi-
ciaire, which are more intensively used in these regions. This helps to 
understand why the 1889 law is discussed for so long: many members of 
Parliament fear that debtors would be incited to go bankrupt, whereas in 
the most important centres it only simplifies the procedure without mod-
ifying the general attractiveness of bankruptcy. 
This suggests that, if the law probably pushes up the number of bankrupt-
cies, the heterogeneity among regions tells also a lot about the dissemina-
tion of the new procedures and the choices made by entrepreneurs, credi-
tors and judges. Indeed, commercial courts’ specificities and the reaction 
of the persons subject to the law play a key role in the explanation of 
local differences. These geographical and institutional differences lead us 
6  For example, Guyot & Raffalovitch (1901, p. 127) suggest that some courts don’t respect 
the timing constraint which was supposed to limit the access to the procedure.
Table 1. Proportion of dépôts de bilan in bankruptcies  
(27 judiciary ressorts)
1840 1857 1865 1869
France 0,47 0,57 0,57 0,44
Average of regions 0,30 0,51 0,51 0,44
Standard deviation/average 0,47 0,24 0,18 0,17
Correlation with previous year  0,50 0,73 0,46
Minimum 0,08 0,30 0,38 0,28
Maximum 0,77 0,76 0,68 0,56
Sources: Compte général de l’administration de la justice. Authors’ computations.
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to consider that, even in a centralized and civil law country like France, 
judges are important drivers of both the global evolution of bankruptcies 
and some of their spatial discontinuities.
5. EVOLUTION OF THE PRACTICES  
AND CHANGE IN THE PROCEDURES 
Another potential explanation for the rise of bankruptcies lies in the 
decrease in procedural costs. These costs are considered along the century 
(and in the historiography) as the most important obstacle to the recourse 
to the courts by debtors and creditors. They are mostly independent from 
the legal evolution itself. However, for many creditors, the most important 
barrier to resort to the commercial courts does not consist in excessive 
financial cost. Instead, it consists in the time needed to get a judgement. 
Map 4. Number of bankruptcies as a proportion of the stock of firms  












Source: Compte général de l’administration de la justice. Authors’ computations and maps.
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The long delay between the start of the procedure and the final decision 
entails uncertainty and loss of time, which in many cases threatens the 
very existence of the business under investigation. Various measures of 
the evolution of this delay can be computed from the available data, which 
does not provide the average length of the courts’ decisions. 
The first one is the number of the cases judged within a given year scaled 
by the total number of on-going cases 7. This indicator is reliable on the 
long period but can be biased in the short run by a drop or a sudden rise in 
the number of new cases. This indicator rises from around 35% during the 
1840s to 55% after 1900. This trend is roughly the same for faillites and liqui-
dations judiciaires during this last period. On the long run, this increase can 
be partly responsible for the preference given by both debtors and credi-
tors to judiciary compared to private settlement. 
The second indicator of court efficiency is the age structure of the opened 
files at a given date. As shown in graph 3, the proportion of the pending 
cases at the end of a year opened less than 6 months before is fairly sta-
ble from the late 1870s to 1913. The creation of the liquidation judiciaire helps 
to keep the length of the procedure identical whereas the number of cases 
tremendously increased. Indeed, this procedure is more rapid than the 
7 It is equal to the number of cases at the beginning of a given year plus those started 
during the same year.
Graph 3. Indicators of the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures
Sources: Comptes généraux de l’administration de la justice (1840-1913). Authors’ computations.
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faillites, which is not surprising since reducing the workload of the courts 
is one of the main reasons for creating this procedure. 
For these two indicators, the leadership of Paris and a few large commer-
cial courts also appears when one looks at the geography of bankruptcies. 
The convergence in efficiency among courts (map 5), which is also at work 
throughout the century, may thus be part of the convergence in the num-
ber of bankruptcies discussed above. 
Map 5. Ratio of cases terminated in a given year to the stock  




















Source: Compte général de l’administration de la justice. Authors’ computations and maps.
However, it may be misleading to consider all bankruptcy cases as similar, 
as the procedures they enter are quite heterogeneous in terms of potential 
duration so that composition effects may explain an apparent improve-
ment in efficiency, especially given the rise of rapid judgments recogniz-
ing insufficient assets (insuffisance d’actif) throughout the period. One may 
fear that the decent aggregate performance of the courts reflect mostly 
that rise, and that the duration of the two “normal” procedures, i.e. concor-
dats and unions, actually increases, discouraging firms from going to court. 
Actually, an ongoing complementary investigation based on individual 
bankruptcy files from the Parisian commercial court’s archives suggests a 
somewhat more optimistic view than these global statistics: the length of 
the median procedure decreases by almost half (from 7 to 4 months) from 
1850 to 1899. Furthermore, if the time necessary to reach a concordat does 
not decrease (it actually slightly increases), the one for settling entire liq-
uidations (unions) decreases sharply (from 16 to 7 months), which suggests 
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the reduction in duration was not only the result of the rise in the num-
ber of insuffisances d’actifs. Taken together, these indications suggest that 
the decrease in the duration of the procedure attracts some debtors or 
creditors from private to judicial settlements, especially before the end of 
the 1880s. It likely contribute to the rise in bankruptcies over that period. 
A significant share of financial costs is related with the taxation of the 
official documents required at the various stages of the procedure, and 
with the payment of the syndic. In response to a constant demand from 
economists, from the Chambers of commerce and other business lobbies, 
the level of the taxes decreases several times in the early 1830s and dur-
ing the second half of the century. In the opposite direction, some con-
temporaries complain about the increasing court’s expenses (Tessier du 
Cros, 1906). If no aggregate statistic is available on that subject, our sam-
ple confirms the decrease of the average value of the expenses of the syn-
dics (including their own wage) scaled by the income they are able to bring 
in the bankruptcy purse. In sum, all procedural costs go down through-
out the century, which can help explaining the surge in bankruptcy cases. 
Our analysis suggests that if the legal changes play a role in the evolution 
of the number of bankruptcies over the 19th century, it does not explain 
this entire growing trend. Instead, it has to be coupled with other fea-
tures, such as the convergence of courts’ practices, and probably with a 
reduction of procedural costs. The increase in the number of dépôts de bilan 
(as expected by the legislator) and a rise in the number of bankruptcies 
started at the creditors’ initiative result from various factors having to do 
with formal and informal rules. We also suggest that the various needs 
of different regions or types of firms require a more diversified menu of 
legal rules. This may explain why, although in the most important eco-
nomic regions the 1838 law allows to reach a satisfying result, a new law in 
1889 is considered as useful, and is maybe necessary in some places. 
6. THE COMPOSITION OF BANKRUPTCY 
OUTCOMES
If the legal changes and the reduction of procedural costs were the 
only explanation of the rise in the number of bankruptcies, and if, 
LEGAL VS. ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE RISE IN BANKRUPTCIES IN 19TH CENTURY FRANCE
41R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 16 0  ➻  4 E T R IME S T R E 2 017
simultaneously, the proportion of firms facing liquidity shortages were 
stable over time, one would expect the outcomes of bankruptcy procedures 
to reflect only the increasing recourse to the courts. This section aims to 
explore this possibility.
The statistics on bankruptcy outcomes give a fairly pessimistic view of 
the evolution of bankruptcies (graph 4). The ratio of concordats to the total 
number of bankruptcies decreases sharply over the period. Paradoxically, 
at the end of the period they are not even the most common outcome for 
liquidations judiciaires. Whereas they represent more than 50% of the total 
number of bankruptcies in the 1840s, the share of concordats decrease to 
less than 20% in the 1870s and 1880s. Thanks to the liquidation judiciaire, it 
reaches about 20% in the 1900s (around 10% for faillites and 30% for liqui-
dations judiciaires). At the same time, closures for shortage of assets (insuffi-
sance d’actif), which represent 20% of all bankruptcies in the 1850s, rise up 
to almost 50% in the 1880s, a trend only briefly interrupted by the enact-
ment of the liquidation judiciaire procedure. On average, they still represent 
the majority of bankruptcies in the 1900s (60% for faillites only). The other 
procedures end up either with the “relinquishment of assets” (abandon 






Sources: Comptes généraux de l’administration de la justice (1840-1913). Authors’ computations.
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d’actifs) procedure or with the liquidation of all assets (unions). These two 
outcomes usually provide quite small dividends to the creditors. 
In this case, Paris is not leading the movement. Actually, the proportion 
of concordats in Paris in the 1840s is one of the highest in France, and it 
falls in line with other regions. 
One can wonder if this sharp deterioration of the bankruptcies’ outcomes 
is consistent with the facts we observed earlier and with the legal the-
ory of the evolution of bankruptcies In comparative statics, such an anal-
ysis suggests that a more liberal bankruptcy law, especially when rein-
forced by a decrease in procedural costs, leads to the choice of a legal 
settlement by firms presenting a better (less distressed) financial situa-
tion, other things being equal. On the other hand, over time a more liberal 
law may lead to more risky behaviour and borrowing by firms, leading to 
a decrease in bankruptcies’ outcomes for creditors. The combination of an 
increase in the number of bankruptcies and a deterioration of their out-
comes suggest that the second effect is dominant. This may also explain 
why the proportion of debtors’ initiated bankruptcies (dépôts de bilan) did 
not increase despite the liberalization. It is also consistent with the fact 
that the decrease of concordats and the rise of unions and insuffisances d’actifs 
appeared even among the category of bankruptcies initiated by the debt-
ors (we cannot measure this directly but it results mechanically from the 
fact that dépôts de bilan still represent 45% of the total number of bankrupt-
cies in the 1900s whereas the proportion of concordats remains below 20%). 
This transformation of the outcomes in a context characterized by a more 
and more intensive use of judicial procedures to close businesses is con-
firmed by our archival sample of bankruptcies. It shows that almost all 
dépôts de bilan ended up in concordat in 1850, when this is only the case for a 
third of them in 1899. At the very end of the century, the number of con-
cordats scaled by the number of cases initiated by the creditors or the court 
decreases to almost zero. 
Except if the commercial judges tend to be more and more severe over the 
period, a behaviour that would be in contradiction with the liberaliza-
tion of the law (not impossible but unlikely given the identity of the mer-
chant-judges), the declining financial outcomes of the procedures (what-
ever their origin) can only be explained by a rise in the number of firms 
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suffering liquidity shortage or a worsening of their financial problems. 
This suggests a study of the link between increased indebtedness and the 
rise in bankruptcies, which we cannot provide in this paper. 
7. CONCLUSION
This paper sought to explain the increasing use of judicial procedures to 
close businesses over the 19th century and the growing number of possi-
bilities provided by the legislator to debtors. We have examined different 
sources of these changes in the legal rules and practices. Thanks to the col-
lection of data published along the 19th century by the Ministry of Justice, 
we show that the number of bankruptcy cases reflects not only a change in 
the legal architecture organising the closing of businesses but also extra-
judicial transformation of the French economy. Our main conclusion is 
that the rapid rise in bankruptcies observed is not only fuelled by the lib-
eralization of bankruptcy law and the decrease in the procedure’s costs. 
Instead, we strongly support the idea that the changes in courts’ prac-
tices and firm functioning played a substantial role, most clearly observed 
through the 1838 and 1867 reforms. 
Our main conclusions are the following:
 − The evolution of bankruptcy law partially entails the rise in bank-
ruptcies over the major part of the 19th century: the 1838 law has an 
important impact; the 1867 law on contrainte par corps is also influen-
tial, even if it was against the wishes of its promoters and maybe 
only in the short run. However, it is of no help to explain their sta-
bilization after 1889. Indeed, the judicial liquidation authorized by 
the law of 1889 only has a regional impact on bankruptcy practices. 
This result contrasts with an idea largely resting upon the examina-
tion of aggregated data. 
 − Court practices strongly differ among regions, and the differences 
in courts’ efficiency and practice are a necessary complement in 
order to understand the variations in the number of bankruptcies.
 − The evolution of the legal context is not enough to explain major 
changes in the composition of bankruptcies. This is particularly 
the case as far as the decrease in the proportion of concordats and 
the increase in the number of insuffisances d’actif are concerned. As a 
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result, the change in the law cannot be separated from a change in 
the global behaviour of firms. These changes not only reflect their 
individual choices when facing liquidity shortage. Instead, they 
likely reveal a change in their financial structure and strategy, pri-
marily an increased recourse to financial debt. 
Further work should allow to precise the respective roles of legal evolution 
and real economic changes, as well as to understand better the reverse 
causality going from economic and judicial changes toward legal evolu-
tion.
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